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Surprise is often thought of as an experience that is elicited 
following an unexpected event. However, it may also be the 
case that surprise stems from an event that is simply difficult 
to explain. In this paper, we investigate the latter view. 
Specifically, we question why the provision of an enabling 
factor can mitigate perceived surprise for an unexpected event 
despite lowering the overall probability of that event. One 
possibility is that surprise occurs when a person cannot 
rationalise an outcome event in the context of the scenario 
representation. A second possibility is that people can 
generate plausible explanations for unexpected events but that 
surprise is experienced when those explanations are uncertain. 
We explored these hypotheses in an experiment where a first 
group of participants rated surprise for a number of scenario 
outcomes and a second group rated surprise after generating a 
plausible explanation for those outcomes. Finally, a third 
group of participants rated surprise for the both the original 
outcomes and the reasons generated for those outcomes by 
the second group. Our results suggest that people can come 
up with plausible explanations for unexpected events but that 
surprise results when these explanations are uncertain.  
Keywords: Surprise, expectation, representation, discourse. 
Introduction 
In day-to-day life, people have a remarkable ability to make 
sense of their surroundings and can effortlessly infer 
connections between events in order to create a rich and 
detailed representation of any given situation. Nevertheless, 
this coherent representation of the world can sometimes 
break down. More specifically, it is known that certain 
events have the potential to surprise us. Far from being an 
isolated occurrence, surprise is actually quite a common 
experience. Because of its prevalence, this phenomenon has 
received a great degree of research attention in cognitive 
science and psychology. Historically, Darwin (1879) was 
the first to classify it as one of the most basic emotions, a 
claim that has been adopted by many subsequent theorists. 
As well as being associated with a distinct subjective and 
physiological response, surprise is known to have some 
important cognitive manifestations. For example, the 
perception of a surprising event will usually cause a person 
to cease what they are currently doing and focus their 
attention on the event in question (Meyer, Reisenzein & 
Schützwohl, 1997). The purpose of such a reaction is to 
discover why the surprising event transpired, so that a 
similar event can be anticipated in future circumstances.  
In this paper, we explore why people find certain events 
surprising and other events unsurprising. Specifically, we 
investigate why presenting an enabling condition for an 
unexpected event mitigates the level of surprise elicited by 
that event. 
Surprise as unexpectedness 
The most intuitive way of describing a surprising event is to 
say that it was unexpected. Likewise, it makes sense to 
assume that any expected event would be unsurprising if it 
were to occur. However, this account can be problematic, 
mainly due to the disagreement surrounding what it means 
to expect something. For instance, if we relate expectations 
to probabilities, then every low probability event should be 
extremely surprising, and vice versa. Evidently however, 
this is not always the case. For instance, while the outcome 
of a lottery draw always has an extremely low probability, it 
is rarely surprising  
In light of this, Teigen and Keren (2003) suggested that 
surprise at a given event might be more accurately explained 
in terms of its subsequent comparison with an alternative 
outcome. Investigating this hypothesis, they carried out an 
experiment which described Erik, an athlete competing in a 
5,000m race. In one condition, participants were informed 
that Erik was in second place behind a lead runner, while in 
another condition they were told that all the athletes, 
including Erik, had formed a large group as they approached 
the finish line. When asked to indicate how surprised they 
would be if Erik won the race, participants in the first 
condition (where Erik was in second place) gave slightly 
higher surprise ratings than those in the second condition 
(where all the athletes had formed one group), despite the 
fact that participants correctly rated Erik’s probability of 
winning the race as higher in the first condition. One 
 explanation for this result is that the first scenario induces 
an expectation (that the lead runner will win the race) which 
is disconfirmed by Erik winning. On the other hand, when 
all the athletes have an equal chance of winning the race, no 
expectation is contradicted if Erik wins. This finding can be 
said to support an Expectation-Disconfirmation hypothesis 
of surprise (see also Meyer et al, 1997). 
Despite the intuitive plausibility of this hypothesis 
however, it may not always be the case that disconfirmed 
expectations lead to such a high level of surprise. Maguire 
and Keane (2006) proposed that surprise may be better 
thought of in terms of Representation-Fit. They pointed out 
that while disconfirmed expectations may frequently lead to 
perceived surprise, this may not always be the case. For 
instance, if a person can account for why an expectation was 
disconfirmed, then they might not be so surprised by it.  
Surprise as representation-fit 
Zwaan and Radvansky (1998) have shown that during 
reading, people routinely construct situation models, or rich 
representations, of the depicted events in a discourse. These 
consist of a number of complex inferences about the central 
characters, their goals and actions, as well as more general 
information about the story’s temporal and spatial context. 
As the reader encounters new events, this representation 
must be continually updated, a process motivated by the 
need on the part of the reader to achieve coherence among 
the text constituents (Graesser, Singer & Trabasso, 1994). 
Accordingly, each new event in a text must be coherently 
integrated into the existing discourse representation for 
successful comprehension to result.  
Based on this premise, Grimes-Maguire and Keane 
(2005b) devised a theory of representation-fit for surprise 
(see also Maguire & Keane, 2006). In short, this theory 
predicts that the more difficult it is for an individual to 
coherently integrate a new event into their discourse 
representation, the more surprising that event will appear. 
As well as being an intuitive view, the underlying principles 
of this theory rest on many well supported models of 
comprehension (e.g. Constructivist theory, Graesser et al, 
1994; Landscape model, Linderholm, Virtue, van den 
Broek & Tzeng, 2004; Situation models, Zwaan & 
Radvansky, 1998). The main way in which this account 
differs from existing theories of surprise is that it does not 
view the process as being dependent on expectation. Instead 
surprise is considered as a retrospective judgement relating 
to how well a given event can be connected with those that 
have preceded it, like trying to fit a piece into a jigsaw 
puzzle. Consider a scenario, for instance, where you walk 
out your front door only to find that your car is no longer in 
the driveway. This is obviously an unexpected, or schema-
discrepant, event. However, if this triggers your memory 
that the car is currently being serviced, you will no longer 
be surprised since a satisfactory explanation for the 
unexpected event has been identified. Conversely, there are 
other situations where you might not experience any 
surprise until the point where you realise that an event 
cannot be easily explained. Consider, for example, meeting 
someone on the street but only later realising that they were 
supposed to be away on holiday.  
A study conducted by Grimes-Maguire and Keane 
(2005a) offered substantive empirical evidence for these 
ideas. They found that when participants were asked to 
indicate their level of surprise for the end event in a 
scenario, they were extremely adept at detecting subtle 
differences in how strongly that event could be supported 
by prior events. They also observed that surprise ratings 
were not correlated with on-line expectations, or forward 
inferences, arguing against the claim that these two 
variables are linearly related.  
 
Scenario body 
Anna has a very important job interview in the morning. 
She has to get up far earlier than usual, so she makes sure 
to set her alarm clock radio for 7am.  
 How surprised would you be if….? 
1 
 
The alarm clock woke her up at 7am 
                                           (Expectation Confirmed) 
2 The alarm clock failed to ring at 7am 
  (Expectation Disconfirmed) 
3 There was a power-cut during the night and the alarm 
clock failed to ring at 7am  
 (Expectation Disconfirmed+Enabling Event) 
4 She had a quiet, good night’s sleep and the alarm 
clock failed to ring at 7am 
 (Expectation Disconfirmed+Control event) 
 
Table 1: Sample scenario alongside four experimental 
conditions examined by Maguire and Keane (2006) 
 
More recently, Maguire and Keane (2006) explored 
whether Representation-Fit is a better explanation for 
perceived surprise than the Expectation-Disconfirmation 
hypothesis. They presented participants with simple 
everyday scenarios, such as that in Table 1, and asked them 
to rate surprise for one of four hypothetical endings. In the 
first condition, the ending was directly in line with the 
expected outcome. In the second condition, this ending 
disconfirmed the expectation (e.g. the alarm clock failing to 
ring at 7am goes against the content of the scenario body). 
In the critical third condition, participants were asked to 
rate their surprise for the same unexpected ending as in the 
preceding condition, alongside a potential enabling factor 
for that event. The fourth condition acted as a control 
whereby the same unexpected event was coupled with an 
irrelevant event that bore no causal relationship to it.  
The resulting surprise ratings revealed that participants 
were significantly less surprised by the events in the third 
condition (i.e. ‘Expectation Disconfirmed with Enabling 
Event’) than in the second condition (i.e. ‘Expectation 
Disconfirmed’ alone). This suggests that surprise ratings 
were based on the ease with which the events could be 
connected with the previous scenario representation, rather 
than on the mere unexpectedness or probability of those 
events. Indeed, events in the third condition were less 
 probable than those in the second condition, as a 
conjunction of two events is always logically less likely 
than one of those events on its own. Subsequent 
experiments ruled out the possibility that participants were 
interpreting the enabling condition as a ‘given’ in the 
scenarios (Maguire & Keane, 2006). Also, interestingly, the 
enabling events in isolation were rated as more surprising 
than when they formed part of the conjunction.  
These results support the Theory of Representation-Fit. 
However, while they demonstrate that the provision of an 
enabling condition lowers the surprise for a scenario, it is 
not clear why this should be the case. In the following 
experiment we investigate this matter in more detail. 
Experiment 
One intuitive explanation for Maguire and Keane’s (2006) 
findings is that participants became surprised in the 
Expectation Disconfirmed condition because they did not 
generate a plausible explanation for the unexpected event 
(e.g. they could not understand why the alarm clock failed to 
ring at 7am). According to this view, the Expectation 
Disconfirmed + Enabling Event condition appeared less 
surprising because an explanation was suggested (e.g. a 
power-cut during the night), thereby offering participants a 
means of integrating the unexpected event into their 
representation. If this was indeed the reason for the 
observed effect, it is important to establish whether 
participants were actually incapable of explaining the events 
in question or whether they simply did not generate such 
inferences spontaneously. An alternative and more 
intriguing possibility is that participants were able to 
generate plausible explanations, but that this did not 
mitigate the overall level of surprise. Surprise instead could 
be due to the uncertainty of the actual explanation.  
In the following experiment, we differentiate between 
these two conflicting hypotheses using three between-
participant conditions. Firstly, a Control group of 
participants were asked to rate surprise for the Expectation 
Disconfirmed (hereafter D) and Expectation Confirmed 
(hereafter C) scenarios used by Maguire and Keane (2006). 
A second Generative group carried out the same task but 
were first asked to generate a plausible reason for why they 
thought these events occurred (e.g. “why do you think the 
alarm clock failed to ring at 7am?”). A third Conjunction 
group of participants were asked to indicate how surprised 
they would be by the occurrence of the same events in 
conjunction with the reasons generated by the second group.  
If participants cannot generate convincing explanations for 
the D scenarios, then we would expect no difference in 
surprise ratings between the Control and Generative groups, 
but higher ratings for the Conjunction group (reflecting the 
unsatisfactory reasons generated). However, if participants 
do not spontaneously generate enabling conditions for 
unexpected events but are able to do so when explicitly 
requested, then surprise ratings should be lower for the 
Generative and Conjunction groups relative to the Control 
group. Another possibility is that a greater level of surprise 
is elicited when the enabling condition is uncertain. Thus, 
for example, participants may hypothesise that a power-
failure caused the alarm clock to stop working, but the 
outcome event may still seem surprising because they 
cannot be certain of this explanation. If this is the case, then 
participants in the Conjunction group should give lower 
surprise ratings relative to the Control and Generative 
groups, since they are provided with enabling conditions as 
part of the outcome event, while participants in the other 
groups are required to hypothesise the enabling conditions.  
Method 
Participants A total of 100 undergraduate students from 
UCD took part in this experiment for partial course credit. 
Data from five participants were discarded due to a failure 
to complete the experiment.  
 
Materials The same 16 scenarios as used by Maguire and 
Keane (2006) were employed for this experiment. Only the 
conditions of C (Expectation confirming scenarios) and D 
(Expectation disconfirming scenarios) were examined. For 
the Conjunction group, these conditions were paired with 
participant-generated enabling events, as described below. 
 
Design The experiment had two stages. In the first stage, 
one group of participants (the Control group) were asked to 
read each scenario and indicate how surprising they found 
the final event, while another group of participants (the 
Generative group) were asked to write an explanation for 
this final event before rating it for surprise. Each participant 
in these two groups was randomly assigned to read six D 
and six C scenarios. The second stage of the experiment 
involved one group of participants (the Conjunction group) 
being assigned to read the same D and C scenarios as the 
other two groups, along with the dominant enabling event 
generated by the Generative group. In sum, this was a 3 
(Group) x 2 (Scenario Type) design, where Group was a 
between-participants factor and Scenario Type was a within-
participants factor. 
 
Procedure For the first stage of the experiment, participants 
were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental 
groups as outlined above (Control or Generative). 
Participants in the Control group were told that they would 
be presented with a number of short stories and asked to 
indicate how surprising they found the final event on a scale 
of 1 – 7. Participants in the Generative group were also told 
that they would be presented with a number of stories, but 
were asked to write down a plausible reason for why the 
final event in the story occurred. Thus, for example, in the D 
scenario above, they were asked to indicate why they 
thought the alarm clock failed to ring at 7am. Following 
this, participants indicated how surprising they found this 
final event (as opposed to how surprising they found their 
generated explanation for the event). Each scenario was 
presented on a separate page and in a different random order 
for each participant. 
 Prior to the second stage of the experiment, the responses 
from the Generative group were analysed and the dominant 
rationalisation for each of the scenarios was identified. In 
order to do this, each participant’s response to each scenario 
was categorised in terms of a distinct theme and the most 
common of these was identified (e.g. for the alarm clock 
scenario, responses fell into the theme of “battery-failure” or 
of “setting the alarm clock incorrectly”). It should be noted 
that there was great uniformity in the reasons generated. 
That is, the majority of participants generated the same 
potential reasons for the unexpected events. Inter-rater 
reliability for the categorization process was high (above 
95%) and any disagreement was resolved by discussion. 
The dominant enabling event for each scenario was then 
presented alongside the original D or C outcome. So, for 
example, the most commonly generated response for the 
disconfirming scenario in Table 1 was “the batteries in the 
alarm clock ran out” and this was added to the original 
outcome to become “The batteries in the alarm clock ran 
out and the alarm clock failed to ring at 7am”. The 
Conjunction group were then presented with the original 
scenarios and asked to give surprise ratings for the 
conjoined outcomes. 
Results and Discussion 
While there was no difference in the surprise ratings 
between the Generative and the Control groups, the 
Conjunction group gave significantly lower surprise ratings 
for the scenario outcomes. These results can be seen in 
Figure 1. A 2 x 3 mixed ANOVA on the surprise ratings 
revealed a significant main effect of Condition, F1(1,92) = 
827.543, p < 0.0001, MSe = .408; F2(1,45) = 923.080, p < 
0.0001, MSe = .190, whereby the surprise ratings for the 
confirming scenarios (M  = 1.91, SD  = 1.29) were rated as 
reliably lower than those for the disconfirming scenarios (M 
= 4.69, SD = 1.6). There was also a significant main effect 
of Group, F1(2,92) = 7.582, p =0.001, MSe = .788; F2(2,45) 
= 5.587, p = 0.007, MSe = .608. Post-hoc analysis using 
Bonferroni adjustments showed that the Conjunction group 
(M = 2.88, SD = 1.89) gave significantly lower surprise 
ratings on average than both the Control (M = 3.52, SD = 
2.07) and the Generative groups (M = 3.35, SD = 1.99, ps < 
0.01). The interaction between Group and Condition was 
also significant, F1(2,92) = 7.441, p = 0.001, MSe = .408; 
F2(2,45) = 9.664, p < 0.0001, MSe = .190, illustrating that 
the Group effect was greater in the disconfirming scenarios 
than in the confirming scenarios.  
These results are interesting for several reasons. Firstly, 
they demonstrate that participants were capable of 
generating convincing reasons for unexpected outcomes (as 
evidenced by the lower surprise for the Conjunction group). 
However, even when they did this, participants in the 
Generative group did not find the outcomes less surprising 
than participants in the Control group. Therefore, the lower 
ratings for the Conjunction group cannot be explained by 
participants’ inability or disinclination to generate 



























Figure 1: Surprise ratings across experimental conditions 
 
The results leave open the possibility that, even though only 
one group of participants were explicitly asked to think of a 
reason for the unexpected events, participants in both the 
Control and the Generative group were attempting to do 
this. In other words, when they read the outcome “The 
alarm clock failed to go off at 7am” they tried to link this 
with the scenario body by means of some ‘causal search’ of 
their knowledge. This assumption is in line with most 
theories of discourse comprehension, which hold that people 
are motivated to coherently link all the events in a piece of 
text together using inferences (cf. Graesser et al., 1994).  
Our results reveal that the reduction of surprise reported 
by Maguire and Keane (2006) was only manifested for the 
Conjunction group and not for the other two groups. At first 
this result seems counter-intuitive. Surely if people can 
think of an explanation for why something unexpected 
occurred, then they should not be so surprised by it? If a 
reader can somehow connect two events together (e.g., by 
hypothesising that the batteries in the alarm clock have gone 
flat), then they should be facilitating representational 
integration and thus lowering surprise. The reasons provided 
by the Generative group were certainly convincing, given 
they had the effect of lowering surprise for the Conjunction 
group. Consequently, the difference in surprise ratings 
between these groups is unusual, seeing as participants in 
both had access to the same information. 
One explanation for this pattern of results is that 
hypothetical reasons are processed differently to those that 
are presented as part of the proposition to be evaluated. 
While people can easily generate a reason for an unexpected 
event, they may not be certain about that reason, and this 
may make the event seem more surprising. For any 
unexpected event, there will always be a number of different 
reasons for why that event occurred. In the alarm clock 
scenario for instance, an alarm clock failing to ring at 7am 
could be due to a power-cut, a failure of batteries, the person 
setting it incorrectly, or even something more bizarre like a 
sabotage effort. When people attempt to rationalise an 
event, they will be aware that multiple explanations are 
possible. Even if one of those explanations seems quite 
reasonable, it is potential that the actual sequence of events 
is more surprising than the most reasonable explanation. In 
 other words, the less certain a given explanation is for an 
outcome event, the more surprising that event should be in 
the scenario context.  
This kind of effect is evident in the way people reason 
about everyday events. For example, imagine you had 
arranged to meet someone in a city location. Ten minutes 
pass and they have not yet arrived – a fact that seems 
surprising. You imagine that perhaps they are stuck in 
traffic but, alternatively, you are aware that this may not be 
the case (e.g. they may have been involved in a car accident, 
which would also render them late). Eventually, when the 
person arrives, they explain that they were actually held up 
in traffic. Your level of surprise subsequently decreases, 
despite the fact that the actual reason for the delay is one 
that you have already considered.  
It is important to note that an effect of this nature does not 
necessitate the generation of multiple hypotheses. On the 
contrary, models of hypothetical thinking maintain that 
people entertain only one hypothesis at a time (e.g. Evans, 
Over & Handley 2003). Consequently, the influence of 
uncertainty is likely to stem from a reduced confidence in 
the hypothesis rather than from the generation and 
consideration of alternatives. For example, in speculating 
why someone is late, you might feel somewhat uncertain 
about the held up in traffic explanation without having 
explicitly entertained any other alternatives. Thus, 
participants in the Generative group need not have 
generated more than one explanation for uncertainty to have 
had an effect. 
General Discussion 
The results of this experiment have revealed a number of 
interesting issues regarding the nature of surprise. Most 
importantly, they suggest that higher levels of uncertainty 
lead to higher levels of surprise. This finding is compatible 
with Maguire and Keane’s (2006) theory of Representation-
Fit which claims that surprise is based on the extent to 
which an event fits with a person’s representation. Figure 2 
illustrates this using a pair of diagrams. The first represents 
the Conjunction condition. Here, the explanation for the 
event is explicitly suggested and so surprise is based on the 
‘goodness of fit’ between it and the existing representation. 
The second diagram represents the Generative condition. 
Here, multiple explanations are possible but since surprise is 
a retrospective judgement, people are aware that only one 
sequence of events can be correct. Given that only one of 
the routes linking the event to the representation can apply, 
the goodness of fit of each route is diluted. Although the 
existence of multiple explanations increases likelihood 
according to probability theory, it also serves to decrease the 
perceived level of fit and increase the level of surprise.  
An example of this effect is a defence lawyer presenting 
an alibi for a defendant. Even though providing multiple 
possible alibis should increase the probability that the 
defendant is innocent, lawyers tend to present only the 
single strongest alibi. Because the jury is aware that only 
one alibi is applicable, presenting multiple explanations 
would actually weaken the case (Kuhn, Weinstock & 
Flaton, 1994). In the same way, considering multiple 
possible reasons for an event makes it seem more surprising 
than considering only the least surprising reason on its own. 
 
Figure 2: A graphical representation of the Conjunction (C) 
and the Generative (G) conditions 
Surprise versus probability 
Several studies have revealed a strong association between 
judgements of surprise and judgements of likelihood (e.g. 
Fisk, 2002). However, from a probability point of view, the 
above reasoning is clearly fallacious: a conjunction cannot 
be more likely than either of its constituents. For example, 
the conjunctive proposition of a power cut and an alarm 
clock failing to go off is evidently less likely than the 
occurrence of the latter event on its own, since this includes 
the possibility that the alarm clock failed to go off for other 
reasons. In this case, is it paradoxical that the less likely 
proposition should be rated as less surprising?  
Given that surprise is not the same thing as probability, 
there is no reason why these concepts should correspond 
with each other. Probability takes into account the many 
different ways in which an event might occur. Thus, the 
more possible ways that something could happen, the more 
probable it will be. In contrast, surprise is a retrospective 
judgement concerning an event that has already occurred. 
Because this event can only have happened in one way, high 
levels of uncertainty will actually increase the potential for 
surprise. Accordingly, less likely events (e.g. a power cut 
and alarm clock failure) can actually appear less surprising 
than more likely events (e.g. alarm clock failure) because 
they minimize the potential for more surprising explanations 
(e.g. somebody maliciously turned off the alarm clock). 
At first glance, the results of our experiments bear much 
resemblance to Tversky and Kahneman’s (1983) study on 
the conjunction fallacy, raising the question of whether this 
might be related to surprise. In a series of experiments, 
Tversky and Kahneman found a pair of events was 
sometimes rated as more likely than the singular events on 
their own. For example when participants where presented 
with a short scenario description of a woman called Linda 
(who was described as an outspoken philosophy student, 
concerned with human rights etc), people frequently thought 
it was more probable that Linda was a feminist and a bank 




   
 occurs despite the fact that the latter option is evidently less 
probable than the former (i.e., since the second option 
covers both of the possibilities that Linda either is or is not a 
feminist). Discounting the possible influence of surprise, 
Tverksy and Kahneman (1983) explained this by virtue of a 
representativeness heuristic where people are likely to 
overestimate representative examples. However, recent 
work by Fisk (2002) has argued that this judgement fallacy 
is best explained in terms of Shackle’s (1969) potential 
surprise theory. According to this theory, individuals’ 
ratings of subjective probability are often influenced by the 
potential of that event to elicit surprise. Fisk (2002) argued 
that people use the potential surprise heuristic rather than 
Tversky and Kahneman’s representativeness heuristic. In 
other words, people think that Linda is more likely to be a 
bank teller and a feminist because it is the least surprising 
possibility. 
In the real world, probabilities and frequencies for 
particular events are rarely available. As a result, people are 
more likely to rely on ‘gut feelings’ rather than logical 
mathematical rules in assessing probability. It may be the 
case that in estimating likelihood, people often rely on 
judgements of how surprising an event would be were it to 
occur. The use of this strategy may be as a result of the 
singularity principle (Evans et al., 2003) which maintains 
that people are incapable of considering multiple 
hypothetical situations at the same time. Thus, the effect 
observed in our experiment may be of a similar nature to 
that observed by Tversky and Kahneman (1983). The 
possibility that Linda is a bank teller and a feminist is less 
surprising as an outcome than Linda is a bank teller because 
the latter includes the possibility that Linda is not a feminist. 
According to the singularity principle, people cannot 
appreciate the concept of Linda being both a feminist and 
not a feminist: she has to be one or the other and thus 
including both possibilities actually increases the potential 
for surprise. This idea can successfully explain why people 
tend to gravitate towards the representative sample, as 
reported by Tversky and Kahneman. If people base their 
likelihood judgements on a single hypothetical scenario then 
they are effectively thinking in terms of surprise rather than 
in terms of probability. In such cases, the most 
representative scenario will always be the least surprising. 
Conclusion 
In sum, this paper has investigated why the provision of an 
enabling condition decreases surprise for an unexpected 
event, while also decreasing probability. We found that even 
when participants were explicitly required to generate 
explanations for unexpected events, this had no significant 
effect on surprise ratings. Yet, when the same reasons were 
presented to another group, surprise was lowered. Thus, it 
appears that although people have the ability to infer 
plausible explanations for events, surprise remains high 
when those explanations are uncertain. In this way, a less 
likely event can actually be rated as less surprising than a 
more likely event. This effect is successfully accounted for 
by Maguire and Keane’s (2006) Theory of Representation-
Fit. Given the link between this effect and the conjunction 
fallacy, future study should investigate the extent to which 
people rely on potential surprise judgements in estimating 
likelihood. 
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